(Please Note this article was written and published on 23 June 2008, I posted it here for regurgitation. It is always good to look back and see where we were and where we are today!)
The current crisis in Zimbabwe has been done a great disservice by the enormous existence of narrative journalism which has evolved into outrageously subjective propaganda serving different motives and interests. The dearth in informed and analytical discourse has not helped matters either. The result has been a permanently polarised and paranoid public opinion that is in most cases misinformed or half-informed much to the satisfaction of the hands behind the drive. Many a time, we have been confronted by questions that need to be addressed with sober judgement, but because of the political jackets that we wear we have been unable to utter the right sentences, rather we have been forced to reverberate the propaganda or risk isolation or loss. In this article however, I intend to take off any political jacket that I may be associated with and articulate the Zimbabwean crisis from an independent position.
First of all Zimbabwe was built and moulded using a democracy template. It was envisioned to be a democracy. In this regard it was visualised as having, The State, The Government and The People. I mean a politically organized society, with a central authority, operating over a territory that monopolizes the legitimate use of force and has a wide range of policy competences (employment, environment, health, product safety, domestic security, research/development, etc.) which it discharges through a few individuals that get their mandate through public consensus.
The State 1980 - 1999
The question that we ought to explore in our quest to elucidate the source of conflict in Zimbabwe is; who is the State in Zimbabwe? The only way we can truly define the State in Zimbabwe by evaluating the distribution of property from 1980 up to today.
At independence, the large-scale commercial farming sub-sector of 6,000 white farmers, owned 15.5 million hectares, more than half of which lay in the high rainfall agro- ecological regions where the potential for agricultural production is greatest. On the other hand the small-scale commercial farming sub-sector comprising 8,500 black farmers held 1.4 million hectares of agricultural land located mostly in the drier agro-ecological regions. Finally the communal areas, inhabited by the bulk of the populace of 4.3 millions people worked 16.4 million hectare of agricultural land, 75 percent of which was located in the drier agro- ecological regions where the soils are also poor. This qualifies the 6 000 as the agricultural elite of Zimbabwe.
Secondly we may need to look at financial property and mining rights. There is a long list of companies that contribute to the balance of payments of foreign governments notably the British government: British American Tobacco,Barclays Bank, Standard Bank, Stanbic Bank, Standard Chartered, CABS Building Society, Old Mutual (insurance and real estate), Rio Tinto (gold miners), Anglo American Corp (agro-industry and mining), Impala Platinum, Zimplats (majority owned by Impala), Freda Rebecca (gold miners), Falgold (gold miners), Metallon Gold, Aquarius Platinum, Rio Tinto (Murowa diamond mine), Mimosa Mining Company (platinum), River Ranche Diamond Mine, Unki (platinum), Murray & Roberts (construction), Border Timbers, Hippo Valley Sugar Estates, Triangle Sugar Estates, Chevron, BP (British Petroleum), Shell, David Whitehead (textile), Edgars Stores (clothing), National Tyre Services, Delta Corporation (beverages), Circle Cement (Circem), Price Waterhouse, Bata Shoe Company, Spar (grocery chain),Coca-Cola among the long list. Thus the vast British interests qualify it to be part of the State.
We also have to take a closer look at the interests and claims of rights by the ZANU PF (at individual and collective level) whose tentacles stretch from Jongwe printers, M & S Syndicate, ZUPCO, Dairiboard through the Nuanetsi ranch to all those that Emmerson Munangagwa runs on behalf of individuals in ZANU PF. In this regard, Mugabe, Munangagwa, the Mujurus, Nkomos, Chiyangwas and a whole lot of others within the ZANU PF congregation qualify to be part of the State.
Summarily, up until 2000 the State consisted basically of three groups; white commercial farmers, the British state and the ZANU PF moguls. Nevertheless, the white commercial farmers (the majority of whom were British) and the British State because of lineage and economic symbiosis behaved as one. For lack ofa better term I will refer to this grouping as the British/white State heretofore.
As Engels puts it,
"The second distinguishing feature is the establishment of a public power which no longer directly coincides with the population organizing itself as an armed force. This special, public power is necessary because a self-acting armed organization of the population has become impossible since the split into classes.... This public power exists in every state; it consists not merely of armed men but also of material adjuncts, prisons, and institutions of coercion of all kinds, of which gentile [clan] society knew nothing...."
The State fortified its existence through the use of specialised bodies like the army, police, CIO and prisons.
To me, the crisis in Zimbabwe started at the Lancaster House in 1979 when the British and ZANU PF reached a blatant agreement meant to perpetuate the strength of the status quo. Joshua Nkomo asked three vital questions:
"The essential questions we have posed constantly to ourselves and which we insist must be understood by all seriously concerned with a solution include the following:-
…
2. Whose army shall defend Zimbabwe and its people? It must be noted here that 60% of the present white army are mercenaries.
3. Whose police force shall protect the people of Zimbabwe?
9. What will be the future of the people's land?"
The British answered by allowing Mugabe to control the Army and the Police but at the same time inserting the Section 16 which guaranteed the immoral perpetuation of flawed distribution of property in its favour, at least for 10 years.
The complexities of defining the Zimbabwean State unravel when we look at the control of the specialised bodies of power. The deposed State gave up military power and allowed Mugabe to build his army according to his own will and Mugabe responded by ensuring that loyalty becomes the basis of conscription into that army. This explains the isolation of the ZIPRA forces and the subsequent clashes typified by the Entumbane battle.
The power of the gun allowed Mugabe to force the State to give him a say in its affairs thereby making him a beneficiary and a player. Concessions were again made, the Old State and the New Military Order united. This explains the joint operations between the white farmers and the Army in Matebeleland from 1980 to 1987. It also explains the token control that was given to "The ZANU PF state" over major companies in the name of indigenisation and black empowerment.
Mugabe became the custodian of British imperialism. As Stromm puts it "the government continued to give political statements of intent by announcing agricultural revisions such as the Land Acquisition Act (1985), but in reality the whites were co-opting government into their main stream, rather than vice versa". This collusion became a well-oiled oppression machine.
ZANU PF and The British connived at Lancaster house to legitimise banditry. At the centre of the crisis in Zimbabwe then was property. They used political power to appropriate and expropriate property that had not been generated within any economic platform. Through political power they conspired to draft laws to legalise and confiscate the property from the supposed rightful owners. Thus, today we find ourselves in a quandary because of their deeds.
What made things work out well for the first ten years? The State and the government were in tandem. The State financed the urgent activities of the government in return for protection. With this perfect relationship, the state found no reason to wish for a change of characters within the government, rather its generous involvement ensured that there was excess capital which pacified the government and ultimately the people.
Summarily, the events after the Lancaster House agreement point to a grand plan which included the gradual conscription of the custodians of the specialised bodies of power into the mainstream thereby guaranteeing perpetuity of the elitist order.
Evolution of the ZANU PF State
Within the ZANU PF assembly existed classes of status which determined the level of influence and ultimately the quantity of benefits from the interaction of the ZANU PF state with British/white state and also from the exploitation of natural resources.
The early years after independence, only a few elite in ZANU PF notably; Mugabe in his capacity as the Prime Minister, Mujuru as the Commander of ZDF, Mnangagwa as the Minister of State Security, Sekeramai as the Minister of State (Defence) in the Prime Minister's Office, were in direct influential relationship with the British/white state and represented the ZANU PF State.
Another few, notably those who did not have military background but had been influential in the struggle for independence were allowed to form the bulk of the government. These did not have a direct influence on the dealings of the state rather; they acted as the intermediary between the people and the state obviously taking instructions from Mugabe and others, who were part of the Zimbabwean State.
The government without those in the State was not powerful. They did not have the power to buy nor confiscate property for personal use. This scenario resulted in the development of a gap between those around Mugabe and those in the government. With progression of time, the people in the government realised that the only way to get property was through "robbery" especially in the dominions in which they had power, i.e. ministries. This heralded the looting that we have grown to associate ZANU PF with, which includes the Willowgate scandal, the Ziscogate scandal, the War Veterans Fund scandal to name but a few.
At the core of most the problems that Zimbabwe has had is the aspect of appeasement. The British/White State sought Mugabe's continued backing through pacification. They chose at the least, to remain silent about many atrocities and iniquities of ZANU PF against the people of Zimbabwe mostly because they (ZANU PF) on the other hand protected their interests. Typical examples were the low-tone voices during the Matebeleland crisis, the one-party state proposal and the violence against Zimbabwe Unity Movement.
The elitist strata in ZANU PF began to blatantly manifest itself at the turn of the first decade of independence. The freedom fighters who had laid their souls for the country on the belief that freedom would bring them prosperity began to see that the "chefs" had forgotten them. Their enemies during the struggle were getting even richer and richer. This prompted the formation of the Zimbabwe National War Veterans Association in April 1989.
There were also growing anti-government sentiments by the general population of Zimbabwe as witnessed by the support given to the ZUM-an opposition party. One of the reasons was the failure of the government to address the land disparity in the country. For ten years the government had only managed to resettle about 71 000 households on about 3.5 million hectares a number way below the demand.
Diminishing support from traditional supporters signalled a need for redress. Mugabe sought to deal with the grievances within the legal framework, which resulted in the crafting of a number bills and laws like the War Veterans Administration Bill (1991), the War Veterans Act (1992), Land Acquisition Act (1992) and War Victims Compensation Act (1993). This was a significant departure from the norm and it unsettled the British/White State as exemplified by the objections of the Commercial Farmers Union to the LAA.
In a gesture of its willingness to continue with the symbiotic arrangement ZANU PF approved the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme which for all its complexities sought to reduce the burden of financing government expenditure from the State by instituting a number of reforms including privatisation and reduced subsidies. Unfortunately, it coincided with the 1990---1993 drought which brought a scourge on the nation.
More and more pressure continued to pile on Mugabe, and the open calls for his departure from the helm of ZANU PF by the likes of Eddison Zvobgo and Dzikamai Mavhaire moved him to cocoon himself by loyalists. Consequently, the ZANU PF state began to pull loyalists and abandoned friends from the dust towards it. In appeasement, the ZANU PF state in 1997 impulsively approved the disbursement of a one-off lump sum of Z$50 000 each which was not budgeted for.
Government expenditure increased but the burden fell on the British/White State and the workers of Zimbabwe. The worst was to come when in June 1998 Mugabe sent the first of the eventually 11 000 soldiers into the Democratic Republic of Congo. As usual the load fell on the British/white state and the workers of Zimbabwe. It is alleged that the funds that the Zimbabwean government eventually used in the DRC conflict was money that was originally earmarked for poverty alleviation and resolving the land problem. One thing for sure, the penchant for spending by ZANU PF did not augur well with the interest of both the British/white state and the workers.
Inflation soared, the Zimbabwean dollar tumbled and life became expensive. Workers were angry at the tax policy of the government whilst the ex-combatants and peasants united in their displeasure of the government's land policy. The echoes of the growing impatience with the government reverberated even through the former tpraise-singers of Mugabe like Simon Chimbetu who sang "zuva raenda" (It is late- in apparent reference to the late resolution of the land question) and Thomas Mapfumo who sang a song entitled "Set The People Free". The calls climaxed with invasion of Igava farm by the Svosve people in June 1998.
The food riots that followed hit the final nail on ZANU PF and heralded a new era where the trade union increased its political presence in Zimbabwe. The signal was that ZANU PF's time in government was up.
Mugabe was left with only one option for him to stay in power; to persuade the British/white state to sacrifice on the key question of land. More blatantly Mugabe sought to compel Britain to pay for its own loss, while allowing him to entrench his rule.
The 1998 Land Donor Conference in Harare was the turning point in that it heralded the first incident of direct British rebellion towards Mugabe. 48 countries were represented including Britain and an agreement was made to set up a taskforce of major donors to work out the modalities for a two-year Inception Phase of the Land Reform Program. Britain refused to join the taskforce insisting a consulting firm undertake an initial economic returns analysis of the programme and assess how far it would alleviate poverty among the poor in Zimbabwe.
This excuse was not without basis given the history of ZANU PF in abuse of donor funds for personal aggrandisement; however there could have been other reasons. Firstly, the 118 farms that were on offer were mainly owned by the British/white state and any successful implementation of the redistribution could have been the beginning of a long phase in which the British/white state would cede control of the Zimbabwe state to the ZANU PF state. Secondly, there had emerged a possibility of change within the political landscape of Zimbabwe as more and more people shared anti-ZANU PF sentiments.
Still ZANU PF sought to deal with the land question in a manner that was not going to largely alienate it from the British/white state. Again it sought to deal with the question of property within the legal framework provided for by the Land Acquisition Act (1992) but met stiff resistance form the white farmers. For example, when Government designated 1471 farms for compulsory acquisition in December 1997 a total of 1393 objections were received of which 510 were upheld. For the remaining 883 farms Government had to go through lengthy judicial processes.
Seeing its impending departure from power, largely because of the British/white state's unwillingness to sacrifice, ZANU PF began the process of transfer of power. The first attempt was Constitutional referendum which was rejected mainly at the instigation of organisations like the National Constitutional Assembly which was largely a coalition of disgruntled groups in Zimbabwe. It brought together the workers, students, peasants and the white commercial farmers.
What should be noted here is that, whilst the Constitution was rejected there is evidence that it was not rejected by the majority because of its inadequacies on the land question but its failure to clearly deal with the issue of the president. People wanted change in leadership because they felt short-changed by Mugabe and this also coincided with the same feeling within the British/white state.
This coalition was viewed by ZANU PF as an attempt by the British/white state to destroy its existence which actually was true. Upon realising this ZANU PF decided then to forcibly eliminate the British/white state's control over property. All along ZANU PF had sought to transfer property ownership through economic acquisition but because this had failed, it resorted to acquisitions based on power and coercion.
The Constitutional Amendment Number 16 of 2000 was an attempt similar to the Lancaster House agreement which sought to legitimise the forceful acquisition of property.
So, by December 2000 ZANU PF had finished setting up the framework for a cohesive unilateral state that controlled the government, had the power to influence laws, influence policies and had a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This is how the powerful ZANU PF State entrenched itself in Zimbabwe.
Emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change
As noted above, a number of factors united the workers, students, peasants and the British/white state against ZANU PF. The victory of the "NO" vote in the constitutional referendum in 2000 gave the NCA the momentum to progress towards a fully-fledged movement that could challenge the ZANU PF hegemony politically.
The MDC was formed primarily as a front against Mugabe. It was a baobab tree with multiple satisfactions. Those who wanted shade got it, those who wanted fruits got them. In this regard, the workers found it as a front against exploitation, students as a front against deprivation of academic freedoms, peasants as a front against deprivation of the basic right to land, the white farmers as a front against ZANU PF expropriation of property and Britain as a front against ZANU PF interference with its economic interests.
Thus at its inception, MDC represented a coalition of disgruntled groups all united by the presence of a common enemy. Indeed for a time the coalition worked, as shown by the massive support it got from the electorate in 2000 and 2002 elections.
One major point of note here is that, of all the five groups listed above only the white commercial farmers and the British state could sustain the financial requirements of the movement, hence their blatant influence in the policy frameworks developed by the movement and the ambiguous ideologies that dogs it.
The strength of this partnership came under test when Mugabe implemented the controversial Fast Track Land Reform exercise. Generally, Zimbabweans agreed that there was urgent need to redress the disparities in land distribution and even MDC acknowledged this fact; however its inability to concisely articulate this issue has led many to believe that it is not committed to resolving the issue in favour of the black majority. Even its written policies seem to be engulfed in the quagmires of diversities under its umbrella;
"When the MDC forms the next government in Zimbabwe, it will accept neither the status quo that existed prior to 2000 nor the position it will inherit after eight years of mayhem and destruction by a criminal elite." (A new Zimbabwe, a new Beginning; Policies of the Movement for Democratic Change 2008)
The emergence of MDC as a political challenger to the ZANU PF government increased the complexities of the crisis in Zimbabwe. It managed to take the rift from the level of the State, to the government and in the end to the people of Zimbabwe.
The crisis in Zimbabwe defined
The crisis in Zimbabwe today is about power. Since 1998, the two former allies have been fighting an economic battle where, ZANU PF sought to destroy the control of the British/white state over Zimbabwe by unilateral plunder and expropriation of its assets whilst the later sought to cripple the capacity of the ZANU PF State to fund the activities of the ZANU PF government by sabotaging its production capacity. The long-term intention of the British/white state is to ensure the withering away of the ZANU PF State and eventually government, both of which would be replaced.
The purpose of the MDC in this struggle is to allow the British/white state to counter the ZANU PF State's ability to seek legitimacy through popularly elected individuals. This has been ZANU PF's trump card, for ; all its deeds have been punctuated by the rhetorical reference to "The people of Zimbabwe's will".
Unfortunately, now that ZANU PF has been rejected by the same people it used to hide behind; it seems the struggle has been taken from the economic level to the military level. The question is whether the British/white State is willing to fight at that level.
The solution
Except in a revolution or violent overthrow of an incumbent government conflicts of this nature can only be solved through negotiations. There has been an effort towards this but it seems the negotiations have been between the ponies of this struggle. The MDC does not have the capacity to make swift decisions that are not approved by the British/white State, at the same time Chinamasa and company cannot make the same without the approval of the Mugabe-led ZANU PF State.
The best solution within the current capitalist setting is for Zimbabwe to have negotiations similar to the Lancaster House Conference in which the two States sit to iron out their differences and draft a clear modus operandi and guidelines of interaction that do not prejudice any of the sides. Both ways sacrifices and compromises have to be made but whatever they would agree, they should ensure that they decisively address the issue of property rights and land tenure because along time it would again erupt as tool for oppression and suppression of innocent people.
It is only when the two States have resolved their differences that a proper functional government can be constituted; either through the ballot or off the ballot. As it is now, the crisis continues and only the rabble bears the pain!
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